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The failure of the latest talks over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam 
(GERD) has intensified tensions between Ethiopia and downstream states 
Egypt and Sudan. What could have been strictly technical negotiations have 
turned into a political deadlock. The GERD has become a new reality chal-
lenging the traditional dynamics in the Nile River Basin. Three key factors 
can explain the current deadlock.
 • The three parties entered the negotiations with different needs and objectives. 
These different positions have historical roots and are part of the respective 
countries’ traditional approaches to Nile Basin management.
 • The GERD is situated in a geopolitical hotspot. The region is turning into a 
competition stage for external actors over its natural resources, such as oil, 
natural gas, hydropower, and precious metals. It is a region evincing a number 
of overlapping conflicts, with alliances forming across conflicts that are becom-
ing hard to separate. The region also hosts external armed forces from over a 
dozen countries, including the United States, France, and China. This creates 
partisanship in terms of which country external actors support.
 • The domestic costs of the negotiations for the three countries are high. State 
leaders tied their own hands in the negotiation process by adopting nationalist 
rhetoric to make domestic gains. The political climate is also fragile, with intra­
state and border disputes leading to waning trust and increased accusations of 
meddling.
Policy Implications
Since the Ethiopian general elections in June, a window of opportunity has 
opened. Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan should seize it to engage in effective negotia-
tions, as it is the only way forward. The international community, including EU 
countries with interests in the region, should play an active role to avoid escala-
tion in a fragile region. They should exhaust various foreign policy tools, using a 
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Tensions Rising in the Blue Nile
The current Nile dispute between downstream states Egypt and Sudan and up-
stream Ethiopia escalated when the latter unilaterally commenced the construction 
of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile in 2011. The 
GERD is the biggest dam project in Africa and the eighth largest in the world. With 
nearly 85 per cent of Nile waters originating at Lake Tana in Ethiopia, the dam is ex-
pected to alter water flows to downstream countries, raising the risk of water short-
ages for Egypt and Sudan. Upon the announcement of its construction, the three 
riparian states embarked on convoluted negotiations that stretched over a decade 
and ended in a political deadlock. We unpack the current deadlock in the GERD 
negotiations, explaining how what could have been strictly technical negotiations 
on the operation of a non­consumptive hydropower dam have turned into political 
tension that threatens to destabilise the region. We demonstrate that to understand 
the current stalemate on the GERD, it is necessary to examine each party’s position 
on Nile Basin management and explain the current deadlock in light of the broader 
geopolitical and domestic context.
Figure 1 
 The Nile River
Source: FAO and IHE 
Delft (2020).
   3    GIGA FOCUS | AFRICA | NO. 4 | JULY 2021 
The Nile River, the longest river in the world, is shared by 11 countries in North and 
East Africa (see Figure 1), and more than 291 million people live within its basin 
(NBI 2020). It has two main tributaries: the White Nile, fed by rivers originating 
in Burundi and Rwanda, and the Blue Nile, originating in Ethiopia. Nile water re-
sources are already being intensively utilised, and the risk of further depletion due 
to regional population growth, increased demand for agriculture, and urbanisation 
coupled with climate change leads the basin to be considered as one of the world’s 
most conflict­prone riparian areas (FAO and IHE Delft 2020).
The GERD is the first major dam on the Blue Nile River of Ethiopia, located 
approximately 20 kilometres from the Ethiopia–Sudan border. The mega-dam con-
struction costs are estimated to be approximately USD 5 billion. Once completed 
and operational, the dam is expected to be the largest hydroelectric power­genera-
tion facility in Africa, which is the main purpose of building the dam, as announced 
by Ethiopia.
The Cumbersome Negotiations Process
The announcement of the construction of the GERD by Ethiopia in April 2011 with 
no prior consultation with or notification of downstream riparian states was met 
with protest from Egypt and Sudan, who viewed the construction as an existen-
tial threat to their water, food, and environmental security. The announcement set 
off a cumbersome negotiations process over the filling and operation of the GERD 
that has now lasted nearly a decade and thus far failed to produce a legally binding 
agreement that takes into consideration the rights and concerns of all three states. 
The following describes the main turning points and difficulties on the negotiation 
track.
 • The International Panel of Experts (IPoE) in 2012: The IPoE was the first 
milestone in the negotiation process, where the three parties agreed to form a 
panel consisting of members from the three states in addition to international 
experts. It was tasked with determining the negative impact of the GERD and 
identifying ways to mitigate it. The panel’s report discloses no basic flaws with 
the GERD’s construction, yet recommends that two further studies on its im-
pact on Egypt and Sudan be conducted.
 • The Tripartite National Council (TNC) in 2014: The TNC consisted of members 
from each country tasked with selecting international consultancy groups to 
conduct the IPoE-recommended studies. The TNC failed due to disagreements 
on selecting international consultants to conduct the studies. Egypt demanded 
the construction of the dam be halted until the studies were completed, a re-
quest that Ethiopia rejected.
 • The Declaration of Principles (DoP) in 2015: The DoP is a remarkable mile-
stone in the relations of the Nile Basin states, following the failure of the Co-
operative Framework Agreement (CFA) in 2010, which provided the first legal 
framework signed by Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia for Nile Basin management. 
The DoP reiterates the necessity of implementing the IPoE studies and commits 
the parties to peacefully resolving the conflict based on principles that recog-
nise Egypt’s and Sudan’s water needs. It also commits the parties to not cause 
significant harm and to equitably and reasonably utilise Nile waters.
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 • The National Independent Research Scientific Group (NIRSG) in 2018: The 
NIRSG, a nine­party mechanism, was created to select international consul-
tancy groups that would conduct the IPoE studies. The NIRSG made significant 
progress in discussing the procedures for the first filling. However, the scientific 
group did not agree on baseline scenarios for the studies, due to Egypt’s insist-
ence on its current water use as a baseline. The three main parties were also 
unable to reach a compromise on the long-term operation and coordination 
mechanisms of the dam.
 • The Washington Round in 2019: Egypt invited the United States and the World 
Bank to the negotiations process as observers. Ethiopia withdrew from the pro-
cess in 2020 and refused to sign the final US­proposed agreement that was 
drafted in Ethiopia’s absence. The agreement sketches out the technicalities of 
the filling and the operations of the dam based on the positions of the three par-
ties. Ethiopia later claimed it was technically impracticable and would severely 
limit the energy-generation capacity of the GERD.
 • The process led by the African Union (AU) in 2020: After Egypt brought the 
dam issue to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2020 and Ethiopia 
proceeded with the first filling despite no prior agreement, an AU­led round 
of negotiations between the three parties was launched, ending in a deadlock 
in 2021. The same chain of events took place in the second half of 2021, when 
Egypt again brought the issue to the UNSC, while Ethiopia unilaterally pro-
ceeded with the second filling. A UNSC session urged the three parties to restart 
talks within the AU’s framework.
The negotiations were derailed by multiple rounds of talks that focused on the 
structural aspects of the process rather than the contentious issues. The first years 
of negotiations were spent on the creation of successive bodies tasked with the pro-
cedural aspects of conducting the IPoE studies. The IPoE studies have still not been 
conducted, despite Ethiopia announcing the second filling this summer. The pro-
cess witnessed attempts by Ethiopia to prolong the negotiations in what appears to 
be an effort to gain time to proceed with the filling prior to reaching an agreement 
that restricts any unilateral action, thereby imposing a fait accompli on the down-
stream countries. Ethiopia has rejected an Egyptian request to halt the filling of the 
dam until an agreement is reached (Al-Jazeera 2020) and has proceeded with the 
second filling, a further unilateral move that diminishes trust in the negotiation 
track. 
Egypt’s Limited Options 
The failure of negotiations can be partially attributed to the different approaches of 
each of the three parties to the negotiations, which reflect their positions not only 
on the GERD but also on Nile Basin management in general.
Egypt depends on the Nile more than any other riparian state. Its dependency 
ratio is one of the world’s highest, with 96.9 per cent of total renewable water re-
sources flowing from neighbouring countries (FAO 2016a). For Egypt, the Nile is 
not only its main source of surface water, it is also an integral part of its civilisa-
tion and culture. Egypt, therefore, has always referred to its historical and acquired 
rights to Nile waters. The legal framework for such rights can be traced back to the 
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1929 agreement concluded between Egypt and Great Britain (on behalf of its colo-
nies) that gave Egypt a veto over any construction project on the banks of the Nile. 
Ethiopia, which was not a colony at the time, does not recognise the agreement, 
arguing that it is a colonial-era design to promote Egypt’s interests. The second im-
portant legal framework is the 1959 agreement between Egypt and Sudan on the full 
utilisation of the Nile. The treaty divides water flowing downstream and allocates 
55.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) to Egypt and 18.5 bcm to Sudan. This was the legal 
basis for the construction of both Egypt’s Aswan High Dam (AHD) and Sudan’s 
Roseires Dam on the Blue Nile.
Given Egypt’s full dependency on the Nile, its free flow has always been a na-
tional security concern. This has shaped the foreign policy of Egypt towards the Nile 
Basin for decades. Egypt was part of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), an intergov-
ernmental framework of cooperation in the basin established in 1999 to facilitate 
the implementation of basin­wide and sub­basin projects in the Eastern Nile and 
Equatorial Lakes. In 2010 Egypt and Sudan froze their NBI membership due to 
disagreements over the CFA, a framework they perceive as jeopardising their his-
torical rights to Nile waters.
Egypt’s policy of securitising the water issue manifested clearly in its position 
on the GERD. The construction of the dam is understood as an existential threat 
to its water, food, and environmental security. Egypt’s primary concerns are wa-
ter shortages, artificial droughts, and a decreased resilience of the AHD. However, 
we observe a gradual change in Egypt’s position – from complete opposition to 
the project to a willingness to make concessions. Egypt suggested that the GERD 
and AHD work as part of a multi­reservoir operation. It agreed that the filling and 
hydropower­generation process should continue even in the most severe drought 
periods and accepted reductions in hydropower generation at the AHD in all cases. 
Egypt has acknowledged Ethiopia’s right to utilise the Nile for its development, but 
insists on not significantly jeopardising its own water shares. Given that the GERD 
has already become a reality, Egypt’s options to mitigate the risks have become 
limited, which explains why Egypt is seeking international pressure on Ethiopia.
Sudan’s Fluctuating Position
Like Egypt, Sudan depends heavily on the Nile, particularly given the frequent 
drought seasons and variability of rainfall. Nearly 43 per cent of the Nile Basin lies 
within its territories (FAO 2015). Before the secession of South Sudan, Sudan was 
seen as Africa’s breadbasket. It has the largest irrigated area in sub-Saharan Africa, 
where the Blue Nile serves around 70 per cent of the irrigated land. 
Sudan had always been considered, at least until 2011, a strong ally of Egypt on 
Nile water issues. In 2010 Egypt and Sudan decided to break ranks with other Nile 
Basin countries on the negotiations over the CFA and withdraw from the NBI. After 
the secession of its southern territories, known for their oil­rich reserves, Sudan 
started to change its position towards the NBI, returning to the bloc in 2012. Sudan 
has shown more willingness to cooperate with other riparian states, yet it has not 
signed the CFA.
As for its position on the GERD, Sudan reacted immediately after the Ethiopian 
announcement was made, protesting and denouncing Ethiopia’s unilateral decision. 
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It declared its strong opposition to the GERD, expressing particular concern over 
its safety. Sudan’s position began to change after the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) 
was ousted in Egypt in 2013. Former Sudanese president Omar al­Bashir, a sup-
porter of the MB, shifted his position towards Ethiopia and appeared to take a more 
pragmatic approach, strengthening economic ties between the two countries. The 
official discourse in Sudan shifted towards the potential benefits of the GERD, in-
cluding electricity imports, flood prevention, and the entrapment of the huge sedi-
ments carried by the Blue Nile. But since the deposition of al-Bashir in 2019 and the 
subsequent aggression of Ethiopian militias in the Sudanese al-Fashqa area leading 
to a border dispute, Sudan has taken a tougher stance on the GERD (Deutsche Welle 
2020), making it clear that it will not accept any unilateral action by Ethiopia. The 
construction of the dam may be beneficial for Sudan, which explains why the coun-
try has not signed onto Egyptian-led initiatives, such as the AU resolution, or the 
US­proposed agreement on the GERD. Sudan’s concerns, however, primarily centre 
on the dam’s safety, in addition to the difficulty of trusting Ethiopia, a country with 
which it has a border dispute. 
Ethiopia’s “Non-Agreement” Goals
In contrast to Egypt and Sudan, Ethiopia’s surface­water resource potential is im-
pressive, but little developed. The Ethiopian economy is mostly based on agricul-
ture, which is primarily rainfed and thus highly dependent on rainfall (FAO 2016b). 
Ethiopia is currently heavily reliant on hydropower for electricity generation. It has 
many reservoir dams constructed for hydropower generation, irrigation, and the 
drinking­water supply. It is estimated that nearly 30 per cent of the population lives 
in poverty and that just 48.3 per cent of the population have access to electricity 
(World Bank 2019). Ethiopia, therefore, is keen on developing its hydro-resources, 
accelerating electrification, and expanding access to electricity.
Ethiopia’s claims to the Nile date back to the last century, starting from the 
1902 demarcation agreement between Ethiopia and Great Britain on behalf of 
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The agreement restricts Ethiopia’s right to construct pro-
jects on the Nile and has become one of the most contested agreements over the 
use of Nile waters. Ethiopia refers to both the 1902 and 1929 agreements as colo-
nial agreements with no legitimacy. Interestingly, rejecting the 1902 demarcation 
agreement compromises Ethiopia’s sovereignty over the Benishangul region, where 
the GERD is located. Ethiopia also does not recognise the 1959 agreement, arguing 
that it grants Egypt and Sudan full utilisation and control over the river. 
Ethiopia has long claimed its right to utilise Nile waters, citing its growing 
popu lation, its changing economic needs, and its natural right to utilise the waters 
for its development. It relies on hydropower projects as the main drivers of develop-
ment and regional integration. Ethiopia and Sudan have pursued, within the NBI 
framework, other infrastructure projects that impact the supply of water to the Nile 
Basin, such as the Merowe Dam and Tekeze Dam in 2009 and the Beles Hydroelec-
tric Power Plant in 2010. However, the unilateral construction of the GERD is the 
first serious move to undermine Egypt’s hegemony over the Nile. The GERD is not 
only a national project central to Ethiopia’s development vision of becoming a mid-
dle­income country but also a tool to change the power dynamics in the Nile Basin.
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As for the GERD negotiations, Ethiopia responded to the two downstream 
states’ opposition by joining the negotiation process and proposing trilateral com-
mittees such as the IPoE. Ethiopia also signed the DoP, yet insists on its sovereign 
right to utilise Nile waters and to operate the dam. All proposals by the Ethiopian 
side are driven by this goal. Therefore, they only address the first two years of the 
filling and do not provide a comprehensive plan on the operation of the dam after-
wards. It seems that Ethiopia entered the negotiation with non­agreement goals 
that best serve its interests.
The Geopolitical–Domestic Nexus
The GERD shifts competition dynamics over water access, which, for many coun-
tries in the region, is a matter of national security. Water security represents only 
one piece of the puzzle. To understand why a multilateral agreement on the GERD, 
a non­consumptive water dam, presents such a complex political deadlock between 
the upstream and downstream riparian states, we consider the broader geopolitics 
in the region, as well as domestic conditions in each state.
The negotiations are steered not just by technical concerns over the filling and 
operation of the dam, but also by worries over the balance of power in the Red Sea 
region and the Horn of Africa. The GERD has the potential to significantly liberalise 
Ethiopia both politically and economically, by increasing access to electricity, fa-
cilitating GDP growth, and attracting foreign direct investment and infrastructure 
development. This could set a trajectory in motion for Ethiopia to grow its regional 
dominance and shift the balance of power between the riparian states, challenging 
Egypt’s traditional leading role in the region.
The GERD is located in a resource-rich area that attracts the interests of regional 
and international actors. The area is experiencing a rise in oil, gas, and mineral ex-
ploration, as well as competition over those resources. The availability of natural 
resources in the territory has made it of interest to affluent countries looking to culti-
vate water­intensive crops for their growing populations in external territories – for 
instance, China, India, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United States have large-scale 
agricultural projects in the region. 
The region is also marked by a number of cross-boundary disputes, such as 
the conflict between Sudan and Ethiopia over the al­Fashqa area, which recently 
experienced renewed intensification when Sudan reclaimed al­Fashqa during Ethi-
opia’s Tigray conflict. The unstable political climate fostered mistrust. Sudan ac-
cuses Ethiopia of engaging in efforts to destabilise the country by selling weapons 
to rebels, while Ethiopia accuses Egypt and Sudan of supporting the Gumuz militia 
responsible for attacks against ethnic minority groups in the GERD’s vicinity. This 
utmost mistrust between the negotiating parties is preventing cooperation. 
The three parties are also engaged in conflict on several other fronts that can-
not be separated from the GERD negotiations. Alliances are being built across other 
regional conflicts that are becoming hard to separate. An illustrative example is 
the Egypt–Ethiopia–Turkey triangle: Turkey, against which Egypt is going head­to­
head in Libya, bolstered relations with Ethiopia after tensions over the GERD inten-
sified. Turkey signed a number of economic partnership agreements and publicly 
supported Ethiopia’s position in the GERD negotiations. This connects a broader 
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regional conflict between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states against Turkey 
and Qatar to tensions around the GERD.
Finally, the Red Sea region hosts external armed forces from over a dozen 
countries, including major powers such as the United States and China, as well as 
European countries, such as France (with major operations on African soil) and 
Germany (with a limited presence in EU and UN missions in Sudan, South Sudan, 
and Somalia). Differences in the geostrategic importance of the three riparian states 
to external actors fosters favouritism as to which party external actors support in 
the GERD negotiations. This led Ethiopia to reject Egypt’s request in March 2021 to 
include the United Nations, United States, and the European Union as mediators to 
pre­empt partisan dynamics. At the same time, we observe the three riparian states 
rallying African countries for support.
As for the domestic context, an unstable political climate and turmoil in the 
three countries in the last decade made it very difficult for any of the parties to 
take a cooperative stance that could be politically costly. Egypt entered a period 
of internal political and economic instability after the Arab Spring. The political 
climate in Egypt is fragile, witnessing repression of protests and opposition groups. 
Moreover, the government is also involved in armed disputes against jihadist ter-
rorist cells in northern Sinai. In the past decade, Sudan experienced the secession 
of South Sudan and cyclical ethnic disputes in the region of Darfur and in Port 
Sudan. The recent waves of popular protest to oust Omar al­Bashir in 2018, fol-
lowed by the coup d’état in 2019, put a transitional government in power that is 
met with disagreement by segments of the population. Ethiopia also experienced 
waves of protests in the last decade. The government of the current prime minister, 
Abiy Ahmed, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, faces ongoing tensions with the Tigray 
People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which escalated into a military confrontation in 
November 2020. Furthermore, Abiy Ahmed decided to hold elections at the end of 
June 2021 despite ongoing allegations of atrocities being committed in the Tigray 
region. Although Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed secured a second tenure, allegations 
of voting irregularities, in addition to the violent conflict and looming famine in the 
north have put his legitimacy at stake (Reuters 2021). In June 2021, a major turn 
occurred in the armed conflict when the Tigrayan fighters entered the regional capi-
tal after Ethiopian government troops retreated from the city. This development 
has changed the balance of powers in the confrontation between the TPLF, which 
was the ruling party in Ethiopia for decades, and Abiy Ahmed’s government. Even 
after the elections, the GERD remains a card that can be played to rally the popula-
tion against external adversaries. 
Leaders from the three riparian states have tied their own hands in the negotia-
tions process. Egypt and Ethiopia adopted nationalist rhetoric to involve domestic 
constituents in the issue. Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi presented the GERD dispute 
as an existential matter in public discourse and publicly pledged that bargaining 
over Egypt’s share of water would be a “red line” (Foreign Policy 2021). This strong-
ly resonates with the Egyptian public, as the Nile has been essential for Egyptian 
civilisation over thousands of years and is an integral part of Egyptian identity, con-
sidering that approximately 96 per cent of the Egyptian population is concentrated 
around the Nile. Therefore, any concessions deemed harmful to Egypt’s water share 
have the potential to adversely affect Sisi’s popularity, as this would be widely per-
ceived by the public as giving away Egypt’s historical right to Nile water.
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Similar opinions can be found on the Ethiopian side, where any agreement may 
be perceived as a move that surrenders Ethiopia’s sovereignty and allows Egyptian 
intervention. The domestic costs associated with concessions are potentially even 
higher for Ethiopia than for Egypt. The financing of the GERD was a nationwide 
struggle. It was framed in the public discourse as a nation­building project that 
would allow Ethiopia to achieve energy self­sufficiency, socio­economic develop-
ment, and technical advancement. After the World Bank refused to finance the 
construction of the GERD and external funding proved difficult to acquire with-
out Egypt’s endorsement, the majority of GERD financing came from the Ethiopian 
people, living both in Ethiopia and abroad. Suffice it to say that the financing of a 
USD 4.8 billion mega­project like the GERD through domestic sources is unusual, 
making it an undertaking of national pride. Similar to Egypt’s High Aswan Dam, 
constructed under Gamal Abdel Nasser, the GERD has evolved into a symbol of 
Ethiopian nationalism. This has made cooperation over the operation of the dam 
politically costly for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. The GERD was used for election-
eering by both the government and opposition groups. This has put Abiy Ahmed 
in a difficult position during the different negotiation rounds, as he has faced sig-
nificant domestic backlash from opposition groups that publicly accused him of 
treason. This gave him little incentive to enter negotiations with the downstream 
countries, as he lacked the political will to come to an agreement over the GERD’s 
filling and operation that would be viewed domestically as a violation of Ethiopia’s 
sovereignty. In sum, the politicisation of the GERD in Egyptian and Ethiopian do-
mestic discourse means that any significant concession from either side will be pol­
itically costly.
Why Should the International Community Care?
The conflict between the riparian states over the GERD, particularly between Egypt 
and Ethiopia, has reached a new phase of escalation. Tensions between the two 
states are on the rise with Ethiopia proceeding with the second filling despite the 
countries not having reached an agreement. Egypt and Ethiopia are crucial regional 
players and two key partners of the United States and a number of EU countries 
that have different interests in the southern Mediterranean and the Horn of Africa. 
The last thing the international community wants is further instability in a conflict­
ridden neighbouring region. Egypt warned that any harm to its water would result 
in “inconceivable instability” in the region (Deutsche Welle 2021). Egypt and Sudan 
are strengthening ties on different fronts, most recently conducting a joint mili-
tary drill called “Guardians of the Nile” in May 2021 in a symbolic move vis­à­vis 
Ethiopia. We do not believe that military action is likely, given its high cost to Egypt 
and Sudan. Yet, other considerations are of importance: As discussed above, Ethio-
pia and Sudan are already tied up in internal conflicts that make them susceptible 
to external intervention. We are already witnessing an exchange of accusations of 
meddling through rebel groups that instigate violence. 
   10    GIGA FOCUS | AFRICA | NO. 4 | JULY 2021
Policy Recommendations
A window of opportunity: The three parties must understand that the only way 
forward is to go back to the negotiation table. A window of opportunity for reviving 
negotiations has opened since the conclusion of the general elections in Ethiopia 
in June 2021 and the international momentum following the UNSC session in July 
2021. The three parties should seize this opportunity to resume talks. The negotia-
tions should not be approached as a zero­sum game, as is now the case. An agree-
ment can be reached only through a cooperative approach where all parties agree 
to make some concessions based on the principle of benefit­ and burden­sharing. 
The agreement drafted during the Washington Round should be taken as a starting 
point for the negotiations, as it is the only comprehensive agreement thus far that is 
based solely on the positions of the three countries. While the text is not perfect, it 
provides a detailed framework for a technical solution. Ethiopia should show flex-
ibility and accept a more active role from the international community.
Carrots and sticks: The European Union, together with its international part-
ners, should play a more active role on the GERD issue to serve their larger inter-
ests in securing and developing their neighbours to the south. They should exhaust 
various foreign policy tools, using a strategy of mixing carrots and sticks. In terms 
of carrots, they should offer facilitation, mediation, and compensation to incentiv-
ise cooperation. For example, a current proposal suggests that Ethiopia generate 
hydropower at a level reaching at least 80 per cent of the maximum capacity of 
the GERD in times of drought. The international community could offer a mecha-
nism that compensates Ethiopian losses in such a rare event. Alternatively, it can 
offer financial assistance for the operation of the GERD. The negative impacts on 
downstream countries could also be compensated by supporting water­governance 
programmes. In terms of sticks, parties should be held accountable if they prove 
non-cooperative. The European Union, alongside its international partners, can 
leverage their political and economic relationships with the three parties to pres-
sure them into making concessions and seeking a solution to peacefully utilise Nile 
waters. Other regional players such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, 
who played an active role in mediating the Ethiopian–Eritrean peace agreement, 
should facilitate the negotiations process given their interest in increasing their 
economic and political influence in the region. 
A regional framework: The GERD negotiations have shown that there is a need 
for a Nile River Basin management framework to coordinate and solve cooperation 
problems. The NBI is an attempt to establish such a regional entity. Egypt, however, 
has not yet rejoined the NBI, although it attends some of its meetings. Efforts to-
wards reaching an agreement on the CFA in the aftermath of the GERD negotiations 
should continue. The GERD has proven that working outside a collective framework 
causes harm to the entire Nile River Basin. A regional framework will provide a 
dispute-settlement mechanism for the future and reduce the likelihood of any uni-
lateral action on the basin.
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